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This paper analyses the intergenerational income mobility for natives and immigrants in 
Switzerland. An IV approach based on data from two different data sets is used. As there is no 
adequate data on fathers, I revert to information from a period that differs from actual fathers’ 
work period. This methodological approach leads to a bias of the resulting intergenerational 
elasticity. Nevertheless, cross-national comparison of income mobility is still possible. A 
comparison across subgroups of the Swiss population shows strong differences between 
Swiss and immigrants. Compared to natives, immigrants are more immobile. Also, substantial 
heterogeneity is found across different ethnic groups. Using quantile regression, mobility for 
natives is found to be similar for all income quantiles. Among immigrants, mobility is higher 
at the lower as well as at the upper end of the income distribution. These patterns differ from 
previous results from other countries. 
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I. Introduction 
 
For almost three decades, economists have focused on the question how earnings are 
transmitted from one generation to the next. The degree to which an individual’s income is 
affected by her parents’ income is seen as a norm to evaluate the societal capability to provide 
equality of economic opportunity. A rich literature exists for the U.S., Great Britain, and the 
Scandinavian countries. Furthermore, some evidence has been provided for Canada, South 
Africa, Malaysia, Germany, and France (for an overview see Solon 1999, 2002). For the first 
time, this paper analyses intergenerational income mobility in Switzerland. Empirical research 
has already shown that Switzerland is characterized by strong immobility in the transmission 
of education. In a cross-national OECD study (OECD 2002), parental influence is highest in 
Switzerland for a child’s educational attainment across 31 other countries (Zahner 2005). 1 As 
education is probably the major mediating factor of mobility (Erikson and Goldthorpe 2002), 
it is to be expected that the intergenerational income transmission should also be very high in 
Switzerland. 
In addition and analogous to Bauer and Riphahn (2005, 2006), who compared the educational 
transmission process for Switzerland between natives and immigrants, I identify differences 
in the intergenerational income transmission between natives and immigrants. This aspect has 
barely received attention in the literature of parent-child mobility.2 Typically, the 
intergenerational transmission process is considered to be identical for all individuals within a 
society. This is astonishing since different economists have already pointed out that a person’s 
ethnic affiliation matters in determining her future labor market success (e.g. see Borjas 
1993). Ethnicity might show the relevance of culture in the intergenerational transmission 
process. The relevance of ethnic differences in the equality of opportunity must not be 
underestimated. At present, almost every Western country is confronted with different and 
heterogeneous waves of immigration. For Switzerland, the share of residents without Swiss 
citizenship is more than 20 % (BfS 2005).3 For the last 50 years, about 70 % of the rise in the 
Swiss population has been due to immigration (Haug 2002). Switzerland has always attracted 
blue collar workers as well as highly skilled immigrants. Blue collar workers are typically 
                                              
1 For Switzerland, Bauer and Riphahn (2005) have shown that a child’s probability to attend an advanced school 
degree is about eight times higher for a child with highly educated parents compared to a child with badly 
educated parents. 
2 Regarding differences among ethnic groups, Mazumder (2001) finds higher elasticities among blacks compared 
to whites in the US. Also for Sweden, intergenerational earnings mobility is lower for immigrants in Sweden 
(Hammarstedt and Palme 2006). Aydemir et (2006) al. find no differences in the intergenerational earnings 
elasticities among immigrants compared to native Canadians. 
3 The share of foreign born residents is similar.  
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handicapped by low education, poor language skills, and few economic opportunities in the 
job market.  
The investigation of the impact of ethnicity on the intergenerational transmission is important 
as it shows how these differences in opportunities among immigrants change from one 
generation to the next, i.e. it shows whether a society is able to provide equality of 
opportunity for disadvantaged ethnic groups. This might inform policy decisions to diminish 
future disparity. 
Studies of intergenerational income transmission typically measure the correlation between a 
son’s and his father’s income which requires data that includes both sons’ as well as fathers’ 
incomes. Unfortunately, there is no data set including both incomes for Switzerland. Instead, I 
use independent samples. In the sons’ sample, individuals have reported certain 
characteristics of their fathers. The fathers’ sample contains the same variables. I use these 
reported characteristics to predict fathers’ incomes. Björklund and Jäntti (1997) have already 
carefully elaborated this approach. For the fathers’ sample, they have access to data from a 
time period when the fathers were actually working. Unfortunately, this is not possible for 
Switzerland. To generate fathers’ income I revert to a sample from a period that differs to the 
actual fathers’ work period. However, I will point out how this biases my results. 
Nevertheless, this new empirical approach has two main advantages: First, as I use 
instruments to predict fathers’ life time income, this technique does not require more than a 
single year for the fathers’ income due to the orthogonality assumption between the 
instruments and the transitory fluctuations of a single year’s income. Second, as I am not 
restricted to match a son with his actual father, I can include any observation from the sons’ 
sample which has provided paternal characteristics. This means that I can include individuals 
at every age. Some studies (e.g. Grawe 2005) have shown that the measure of 
intergenerational income transmission is very sensitive to a son’s age class. Most studies face 
the problem that the observed child is very young and neglect that those children with higher 
life-time incomes experience a higher income growth later in their lifes. The resulting 
measurement error of the child’s life time income leads to a downward bias of the 
intergenerational correlation (see Solon 2002, Bound et. al. 1994). As I do not attempt to 
match sons with their real fathers, I can use the entire age range of the child sample. Thus, my 
results are not affected by such a downward bias. 
This paper will proceed as follows. Section II describes the data and the necessary 
adjustments due to missing values as well as the correction of the standard errors due to the 
IV approach with two different data sets. In Section III, I address the regression to the mean 
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model and the intergenerational correlation: Part A illustrates the problem of my empirical 
approach and works out the resulting bias of the least squares coefficient. In Part B, the results 
from the least squares estimations are presented. Section IV covers the differences in the 
intergenerational income transmission across the income distribution: Part A provides 
background and methods, Part B presents the results. Finally, this paper ends with a 
conclusion in section V. 
 
 
II Data and Procedures 
 
A. Data 
 
The data for the sons are taken from the Swiss Household Panel (SHP) from the years 1999-
2003. Started in 1999, the first wave of the data contains a representative sample of the Swiss 
population with around 5100 households and 7800 individuals. Included are only persons 
with a permanent residence in Switzerland. This “Living in Switzerland survey” covers a 
broad range of social topics and provides objective (income, living conditions, and situation 
within a family) as well as subjective information (attitudes, perceptions, and personal 
values). Further, information about the person’s parents, such as fathers’ education, work 
situation, and socio-economic position is given.  
The corresponding information to calculate fathers’ incomes is taken from the Swiss Labor 
Force Survey (SLFS), using the years 1991-2003. Based on telephone interviews, the SLFS is 
a rotating panel where an individual is interviewed up to five times. Besides a full range of 
labor information, the questionnaires also target more general socio-economic indicators.  
There are three primary reasons to choose the SLFS for the fathers’ sample. First, with about 
17’000 households per year, the SLFS is the largest panel providing income-data for 
Switzerland. Second, in comparison to all other Swiss datasets, the SLFS reaches furthermost 
back to the year 1991. Even if the SLFS does not cover the fathers’ working period, it is 
important to use a panel that minimizes this time distance to the period when fathers were 
actually working. And third, apart from the income information, the SLFS includes the same 
father characteristics as provided by the sons in the SHP.  
I use three variables as predictors of fathers’ income: the International Standard Classification 
of Occupations (ISCO) as a proxy for fathers’ occupations, the highest education received, 
and a dummy indicating if the individual has Swiss citizenship. I create a set of dummies 
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describing each outcome of the ISCO and education variable.4 In order to get a close 
correspondence between the fathers and the sons’ samples, some education levels are 
combined. I created nine classes for the ISCO variable and eight different graduation levels. 
Further, I fully interacted citizenship with both education and ISCO classification. This gives 
me 35 different dummies to predict fathers’ income.  
To analyse heterogeneity by ethnicity, I define several subgroups. As there is no information 
about a person’s origin respectively his father’s origin, a son’s ethnic affiliation is defined by 
his nationality.5 Natives are those with only a Swiss passport whose parents both have a Swiss 
passport only.  
For completeness, as I use the sons’ education later as a further control, I categorize the 
different education levels into three dummy variables: Those who have not completed 
mandatory school or who didn’t pursue any other education are defined to have a low 
education. Those who completed vocational training or any school except advanced school 
have medium education. Finally, the high category contains persons who completed an 
advanced school allowing to enter university or who have a university degree. 
I include only males aged 25 to 55. 6 All sons as well as fathers have to hold a full-time or a 
part-time job. If they work part-time, information about the percentage of the part-time job 
must be given. An income from part-time work was extrapolated to a full-time job. 
Furthermore, I drop all those who have a work interruption longer than six months in the year 
of the interview. This should ensure that no earnings capacity is underestimated due to a non-
earning period in the recent year. I also exclude individuals without information about fathers’ 
socio-economic status or schooling. Finally, I drop the lowest and highest quarter percent of 
the income distribution. 7 With 7212 observations and 2138 individuals in the sons’ sample, I 
                                              
4 The ISCO classification is almost identical to the ISCO1- categorization (for an overview, see International 
Labour Office 1990). The only exception is the category of armed forces. As the Swiss Military service is a 
militia system, there is only a very small fraction of professional soldiers in the Swiss military system. Those are 
more or less in teaching functions or technicians. Therefore, I generally categorized them into the group of the 
technicians. 
5 If the son holds a Swiss citizenship, but one of his parents has a foreign nationality, the son is categorized by 
his parents’ nationality. This is done to completely consider any ethnic impact that might result from an 
individual’s household. Be aware that nationality is a somewhat weak variable compared to the place of birth. As 
a person’s nationality might change, his ethnic origin – if just measured by nationality – might be unobservable. 
Thus, by considering parents’ nationality, I can accommodate such a unobserved ethnic affiliation. Further, if 
both parents have different foreign nationalities, I use the father’s nationality.  
6 The fathers sample contains men aged 25 to 65. For robustness, I re-estimated the intergenerational correlation 
using only individuals aged 25 – 55 in the fathers’ sample. The results are very similar. 
7 The SHP and the SLFS contain a few very implausible income values at the extremes of the income 
distribution. The exclusion of these observations should prevent a bias. For robustness, I also re-estimated the 
elasticities without this exlusion. The results are very similar and presented later. 
410 observations were lost due to their non-working status, 46 individuals were dropped out due to a work 
interruption longer than six months, and 710 with no information about fathers’ characteristics. 
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keep about 85 percent of all males aged 25 – 55 who filled out the personal questionnaire.8 
Both for father and son, income is expressed in constant 1998 Swiss Francs using the Swiss 
CPI as deflator. 
 
B. Robustness checks and data adjustments 
 
Unfortunately, there is no information about the fathers’ age given by the sons in the SHP. 
Thus, it is hardly possible to assign an actual working period to father. In addition, as the 
SLFS starts only in 1991, the data are gathered in a period that probably differs from the 
fathers’ actual working period. Therefore, I work with several subsamples of the SLFS to test 
the sensitivity of my results. I compose four different father samples from the SLFS: I apply 
two samples from 2 waves, the first from 1991 and the wave from 1998, the year before the 
sons’ panel has started. A further subsample includes all individuals from 1991 – 2003. For a 
son or father who appears in different waves, I calculate the average work income. Finally, I 
also generate a sample with individuals who are observed in five different waves. This is done 
to compare my results with a father sample that corresponds closest to a father sample usually 
used in the literature on intergenerational mobility.9 
 
The summary statistics are presented in tables 1 and 2. Table 1 lists the means of the variables 
from the SHP for all sons and by different subsamples. Table 1 A shows the relevant sons’ 
characteristics. Table 1 B presents the fathers’ characteristics as reported by the sons. Table 2 
shows the corresponding father characteristics in the SLFS. 10 In general, the mean of the 
characteristics in all fathers’ subsamples are similar. The sample including only individuals 
who are observed in 5 different years has a higher mean work income. Also, the share of 
fathers with an incomplete education or who only completed compulsory school is somewhat 
smaller than in the other subsamples. I find the strongest differences for the share of 
individuals with a foreign citizenship. Here, the range is between a share of 13 % (for 
individuals observed 5 years) up to 27 % (for the subsample with all individuals).11 
                                              
8 To evaluate the robustness of my findings, I re-estimated the model for intergenerational income mobility 
applying different other subgroups. The results are all similar and presented later in the text. 
9 A large number of studies of intergenerational mobility uses (up to) 5-years average of annual earnings (see 
Solon 1999, 2002). 
10 A number of indicators show substantially different means for the SHP and the SLFS. Thus, it is obvious that 
fathers’ distribution in the SLFS does not correspond to the distribution in the son’s sample. As a further test, I 
weighted the SLFS to generate an identical distribution as in the son’s sample. All re-estimates are very similar 
to the estimates from the unweighted samples. 
11 Table A1 in the appendix presents the results from the prediction of fathers’ incomes by subsamples of the 
SLFS. 
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As the sons did not report the age of their fathers, I deduct the age component from income, 
both for sons and fathers: income is first regressed on a set of dummy variables for the age of 
the individual. The residuals combined with the intercept are then used as the age-adjusted 
incomes.12 
It is worth noting that the exclusion of individuals who don’t work should not lead to a 
selection bias in this case, as the average male labour force participation rate between 1990 
and 2000 in Switzerland for the age group 25 – 55 was above 97% (BFS 2002). Thus, a 
correction for sample selection is not necessary. A more serious problem might result from 
the fact that not all individuals in the final sample provided their yearly income. In the sons’ 
sample, there are about 14.2% missing values, in the fathers’ sample 14.9%. However, to 
maintain up the representativeness of the samples I use multiple imputation (Rubin 1978, 
1987), both for the sons’ as well as for the fathers’ sample.13 Besides, as it is important to 
have an adequate number of observations in investigating different ethnic subgroups, multiple 
imputation augments the degrees of freedom. 
Further, as I generate the father’s income by a set of characteristics from a different data set, I 
have to adjust the standard errors. Unlike Björklund and Jäntti (1997) who estimated the 
asymptotic variances using a bootstrap method over both fathers’ and sons’ samples, I treat 
the fathers’ income as an imputed value in the sons’ data. This methodology has the 
advantage that it uses the calculated variances from the intergenerational transmission 
regression and adjusts those by the dispersion from different coefficients for each father’s 
characteristic: I bootstrap the fathers’ sample k times to generate k coefficients for each of the 
35 fathers’ characteristics. Thus, for each son, k different father incomes are generated (for an 
extended introduction to the bootstrap method, see Efron and Tibshirani 1993). The son’s 
income is then regressed on each of the father’s k incomes. Finally, the point estimate of the 
coefficient and its variance are calculated using again Rubin’s (1976, 1996) formulas. The 
repeated-imputation estimate aρ
)  is the average of the k coefficients from the k regressions 
                                              
12 As age is a potent predictor in determining incomes, to filter out the age component strongly reduces a 
possible measurement error of the resulting coefficient.  
13 I used a software by Schafer (Schafer 1997). Based on a multivariate normal distribution, a system of 
simultaneous regression models is used in which each variable depends on all others (Schafer and Olsen 1998). 
The assumed missingness mechanism is “missing at random” (Rubin 1976, Little & Rubin 1987). I apply a large 
set of dummies for age, the socio-economic status in different forms (ISCO- Index, Wright class index, Swiss 
socio-economic index), schooling, and the size of the company the individual is working in (in numbers of 
employees). For the set of the sons, I additionally included different socio-economic status of the fathers (ISCO, 
Wright class index, Swiss Socio-Economic Status), and their schooling. Using data augmentation (Tanner & 
Wong, 1987), I replace the missing values by a set of 5 plausible values. After performing identical analysis on 
each of the 5 datasets, the results (estimates and standard errors) are combined, using simple rules provided by 
Rubin (1987). 
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k
a q
q 1
ρ ρ / k
=
= ∑) ) . (1) 
The variance is  
 a
k 1Var(ρ ) W B
k
+= +)  (2) 
where B is the between imputation variability 
 
k
2
q a
q 1
B (ρ ρ ) /(k 1)
=
= − −∑ ) )  (3) 
and W is the within-imputation variability  
 
k
q
q 1
W Var(ρ ) / k
=
= ∑ ) . (4) 
Thus, the adjusted variance (2) is composed of an averaged variance from the son-father 
regression in the sons’ sample (within-variance W) and the dispersion in the different qρ
) ’s 
resulting from differences in the bootstrapped incomes of the fathers (between-variance B), 
i.e. the adaptation of the variance from the estimated coefficients in the fathers’ sample. 
 
 
III. Intergenerational Correlation 
 
A. Bias and measurement error of the least squares coefficient 
 
Following the classical approach, I define the son’s long-run income as a function of the 
father’s long-run income 
 si fi iy ρy ε= +  (5) 
where both siy  and fiy are log incomes and measured as deviations from their respective 
means; iε  is white noise. Now, there are three main measurement problems I am confronted 
with when analysing the intergenerational income mobility in Switzerland. The first and 
probably best known in the literature of intergenerational mobility is the non-observability of 
life-time income. Solon (1992) has shown that using annual income as a proxy for long-run 
income yields a downwards inconsistency of the least squares estimate ρ . Assuming that the 
son’s and the father’s annual income sity  and fity  are defined as 
 sit si sity y v= +  (6) 
and 
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 fit fi fity y v= + , (7) 
yearly earnings are assumed to equal long-run earnings plus a transitory fluctuation, sitv  for 
the sons and fitv  for the fathers, respectively. As the variance of the fathers’ transitory 
fluctuation appears in the denominator of the least squares estimator, the true parameter is 
underestimated. Solon (1992) has pointed out that if annual income is available for several 
years, the inconsistency can be reduced:  
 
T
fi fi fit fi fi
t 1
1y (y v ) y v
T =
= + = +∑  (8) 
The higher the number of yearly incomes T that approximate the life-time income, the 
less fiVar(ν ) , and the less underestimated is the resulting income correlation. 
The second problem results from the non-availability of the fathers’ yearly earnings. As I 
have no data on the fathers’ annual incomes, but observe only some characteristics of the 
fathers, I assume that fiy  is described by the following equation 
 fi fi fiy β 'X u= + . (9) 
where the variance of fiy , the fathers’ life-time income, is 
 
fi
2
fi fi fi uVar(y ) β 'X X 'β σ= +  (10) 
fiX  is a vector of explanatory variables, β  is a coefficient vector and fiu  the stochastic term 
that can not be explained by the characteristics fiX . If fiX  completely explains the fathers’ 
life-time income, fiu  would be zero. Following Björklund and Jäntti (1993), the resulting 
estimate of ρ has the following probability limit: 
 
s
si, fi si, fi
N
fi fi
Cov(y y ) Cov(y u )
lim ρ
β 'X X 'β→∞
−=)  (11) 
Compared to the unbiased least squares estimator of ρ , the numerator of equation (11)14 will 
be reduced by the covariance between the sons life-time income and fiu . The denominator will 
be reduced as the variance of the predicted father’s income fiβ 'X
)
 does not include 
fiu
σ . 
Björklund and Jäntti (1997) have provided one example where expression (11) overestimates 
the true ρ .15 
                                              
14 For a complete derivation of equation (7), see Björklund and Jäntti (1993). 
15 They have compared income mobility in Sweden and the United States. While the Swedish data lacks actual 
fathers’ income, the U.S. sample both contains the sons’ as well as their fathers’ incomes. Thus, a comparison 
between equation (1) and equation (7) could be provided for the U.S. 
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The third problem when analysing intergenerational income transmission in Switzerland is 
new in the mobility literature. I can not use a fathers’ sample from the correct period, i.e. 
when fathers were really working. Instead, I use a sample from a period that probably differs 
from the fathers’ actual work period. Fortunately, I can in large parts adopt the empirical 
procedure by Björklund and Jäntti (1993) and reintegrate this further problem.16 My point of 
departure is again equation (9). Substituting equation (8) for fiy  into (9) yields 
 fi fi fi fiy β 'X u v= + +  (12) 
β  describes the correlation between the fathers’ characteristics and their incomes. As the 
sample period does not correspond to the fathers’ working period, I can not estimate β  
properly. Instead, my estimation is 
 fi fi fi fiy (β γ) 'X u v= + + +  (13) 
where β is the real correlation between the fathers’ characteristics and the fathers’ income at 
the time when the fathers were actually working, and γ  is the change in time of this 
correlation from the real working period up to the time when the fathers are observable. 
Using least squares, my estimated β
)
 for calculating the fathers’ income has now the following 
equation 
 
1 1 1 1 1
t
1 1
β (X 'X) X ' y (X 'X) X 'Xβ (X 'X) X 'Xγ (X 'X) X 'u (X 'X) X ' v
β γ (X 'X) X 'u (X 'X) X ' v
− − − − −
− −
= = + + +
= + + +
)
 (14) 
As the number of observations in the fathers’ sample Nf is large, then 
f
1
N
lim (X 'X) X 'u 0−→∞ →  
and
f
1
N
lim (X 'X) X ' v 0−→∞ → , and β
)
 corresponds to β  and γ .17 The fathers’ long-run income can 
be calculated inserting the coefficients β
)
, estimated in the fathers’ sample, into the sons’ 
sample 
 s s s 1 s 1 sfi fi fi fi fi fiy β 'X β 'X γ 'X ((X 'X) X 'u) 'X ((X 'X) X ' v) 'X
− −= = + + +))  (15) 
s
fiX  is a matrix containing the fathers’ characteristics, reported by the sons. 
Defining 1 sfiU ((X 'X) X 'u) 'X
−= , 1 sfiV ((X 'X) X ' v) 'X−= , and sfi fiy γ 'XΔ = , and substituting 
equation (9) into (15) yields 
 fi fi fi fiy y y U V u= + Δ + + −)  (16) 
And due to the orthogonality assumption 
                                              
16 For convenience, I use a similar notation they used. 
17 This follows from orthogonality between the stochastic terms ufi and v  and the fathers’ characteristics. For a 
detailed analysis of the properties of the estimates from IV regression from two samples, see Angrist and 
Krueger (1992). 
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 fi fi fi fiy y y u= + Δ −)  (17) 
The true fathers’ income and the estimated fathers’ income differ in two ways: First, 
unlike fiy , fiy
)
 contains fiyΔ , the change of the father’s income due to a change of the 
correlation in time between the father’s characteristics and the father’s long-run income. Also, 
as the father’s characteristics do not cover the complete life-time income, fiy
)
 does not include 
fiu , the stochastic component of fiy . The estimation of ρ  has now the following probability 
limit 
 
s s
s
N '
si fi si 1
N 2N N
fi si 1
N '
si fi fi fii 1
s s s s s sN
fi fi fi fi fi fi
si, fi si, fi si, fi
s s
fi fi fi fi fi
y y / N
lim ρ lim
y / N
y (y y u )
lim
β 'X X 'β γ 'X X 'γ 2β 'X X 'γ
Cov(y y ) Cov(y y ) Cov(y u )
β 'X X 'β Var( y ) 2Cov(y , y )
=
→∞ →∞
=
=
→∞
=
+ Δ −= + +
+ Δ −= + Δ + Δ
∑
∑
∑
))
)
 (18) 
It is recognizable that equation (18) contains the same terms as equation (11), the resulting 
estimator from Björklund and Jäntti (1993). Further, the bias in equation (18) depends on the 
variance of fiyΔ , the change of the fathers’ income, and its covariance with the son’s and the 
father’s life-time income. In case that fathers’ income would not have changed over time, i.e. 
tγ = 0, equation (18) and equation (11) would be identical and my results could be directly 
compared to the results by Björklund and Jäntti (1997). Of course, such an assumption is not 
plausible. But it would be much less restrictive to assume that the change in the fathers’ long 
run income is independent of the sons’ and fathers’ long run income, i.e. that the covariances 
are both zero. Keep in mind that fiyΔ  is the difference between the real and the observed 
fathers’ income. This difference results from a change of the correlations between certain 
income predicting characteristics and income. There might be several reasons why such 
relationships between theses characteristic and income might have changed, for example due 
to a progress in technology or a change in the supply or demand of a certain profession. But 
there is no reason to expect that the fathers’ real income should be related to this 
(chronologically later) change in time of the influence of the fathers’ characteristics on the 
incomes.  
However, given this assumption, equation (18) can be simplified to 
 
s
si, fi si, fi
s sN
fi fi fi
Cov(y y ) Cov(y u )
lim ρ
β 'X X 'β Var( y )→∞
−= + Δ
)  (19) 
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or 
 fi
s
fi
s s 2
fi fi usi, fi
s s 2N
si, fi fi fi y
β 'X X 'β σCov(y u )
lim ρ 1 * ρ
Cov(y y ) β 'X X 'β σ
BA
→∞ Δ
⎛ ⎞ +== −⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟ +⎝ ⎠
==
)
1442444314424443
 (20) 
where 
fi
2
uσ  and fi
2
yσΔ  are the variances of ufi and fiyΔ  respectively. 
Unfortunately, we can hardly see in which direction the estimator in equation (20) is biased 
compared to the unbiased ρ . If si, fiCov(y u )  and si, fiCov(y y )  have the same sign, A is less 
than 1. On the other side, B is less than 1 if 
fi
2
yσΔ > fi
2
uσ . The better the fathers’ life-time 
incomes can be explained by their characteristics, the smaller will be fiu  and fi
2
uσ . At the 
extreme, in case that their characteristics would completely explain the variance of fathers’ 
income, 
fi
2
uσ  would be zero, B would be less than 1 and the estimated parameter would be 
downward biased.18 
However, another interesting point is that equation (19) only differs from equation (11) in the 
variance of fiyΔ  in the denominator. Thus, my resulting estimator is downward biased 
compared to the estimator of Björklund and Jäntti (1993): Their results can be regarded as a 
lower bound. This means that although the direction of the resulting bias is not detectable, 
cross-national comparison might still be possible. For example, if I would find higher 
elasticities for Switzerland compared to the elasticities they found for the U.S. and Sweden, a 
conclusion that mobility is lower in Switzerland would be appropriate. 
 
B. Results from the least squares estimation 
 
I start presenting the estimated elasticities using OLS. Table 3 A shows the least squares 
coefficients for different subsamples of the SLFS. Focusing first on the SLFS wave from 
1991, I find an overall elasticity of 0.455.19 With an elasticity of 0.55 compared to 0.38, the 
estimates for immigrants are much higher than those for the natives. If I compare sons having 
an immigrant father to sons being immigrants, the elasticity even rises up to 0.62. Generally, 
it seems that immigrants are more likely to tread in their fathers’ footsteps regarding their 
income than natives. Analysing the group of immigrants in greater detail, there are strong 
differences between ethnic groups. I find the highest elasticity for Spain, Portugal, and Italy. 
The smallest coefficients are found for Germany and South Eastern Europe, which are not 
                                              
18 At another extreme, in case that Cov(ysi,ufi)  = Cov(ysi,yfi), the estimated coefficient would be zero. 
19 Under the assumption mentioned in the section above, Switzerland is less mobile than Sweden. As the 
corresponding value for the U.S. lies above the Swiss elasticity, inference is not possible. 
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even significant. It is of interest that those ethnicities with high elasticities have a similar 
migration background: immigrants from Italy and Spain typically entered in the 1950s and 
1960s during an economic boom period in Switzerland. Mostly, they worked in blue collar 
jobs. In contrast, the migrational inflow from immigrants from South Eastern Europe came in 
the 1980s and – as a consequence of the civil war in Former Yugoslavia – in the 1990s. Their 
migration motives are much more heterogeneous than those of the Spanish and the Italians. 
Besides the small number of observations, this might be a reason why there is no significant 
relationship between sons’ and fathers’ incomes for South Eastern Europe. 
Column 3 shows the intergenerational elasticity with a control for the sons’ education. The 
inclusion of education in the estimation allows one to measure how much of the 
intergenerational income correlation is due to educational attainment. The stronger the 
reduction of the elasticity the more powerful is education in explaining the intergenerational 
transmission. Further, it is of interest to analyse whether education has a different impact on 
the intergenerational income mobility by ethnicity. Generally, there is an overall reduction of 
the mobility-coefficient by about 40%. This finding is in line with the previous research. (e.g. 
Eide and Showalter 1999, Blanden 200520). The reduction is somewhat higher for immigrants 
than for the Swiss. Education seems to be more important if one has a father with a foreign 
nationality. The reduction is about 49% compared to 39% for individuals with a Swiss father. 
Conditional on a son’s nationality, as a simple interpretation, education is most valuable for 
Spanish and Portuguese whereas their mean level of education is also lowest. On the other 
hand, education only accounts for roughly 18 percent for French immigrants whereas their 
mean level of education is highest. Generally, differences in the impact of education on the 
intergenerational income mobility simply seem to reflect differences in the level of education 
across different ethnic groups.  
For robustness, columns 4 – 6 of table 3A show the correspondent results for different 
compositions of the fathers’ sample. The data section has already addressed the importance of 
such robustness checks. Analysing all individuals, the coefficients for the other subsamples lie 
between 0.41 and 0.44. On average, using the fathers’ sample from the year 1991 leads to 
larger elasticities of about 0.03 – 0.04 compared to the sample from 1998; the sample 
including all fathers from 1991 to 2003 undervalues the results by about 0.03 compared to 
wave 1991. For the subsample with fathers who appear in five different waves, the elasticity 
is somewhat smaller than that of the 1991. It is hard to say if these smaller values result due to 
                                              
20 Blanden (2005) has decomposed the elasticity for the U.S., UK and West Germany. She finds that education 
explain between 35 and 50 percent of the intergenerational mobility. In contrast, recent studies from Aydemir et. 
al. (2006) only find a weak impact of education on the intergenerational elasticity for Canadian immigrants. 
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a worse correspondence of the respective fathers’ sample to the real fathers’ sample. 
However, the numbers in brackets in columns 4 – 6 indicate t-values for the null hypothesis 
that the parameters in column 4 – 6 are identical to the corresponding ones in column 2.21 
With a single exception22, this hypothesis can not be rejected for all subsamples even of a 10 
percent level of significance. Thus, the results are not sensitive regarding a specific subsample 
of the fathers. 
For another check of the sensitivity of my results, table 3 B presents the least squares 
estimates using different subsamples of the SHP. I concentrate on the fathers’ sample from 
wave 1991.23 Column 1 presents again the results as in column 1 of table 3 A. Columns 2 to 4 
test the robustness of the coefficient regarding the included observations. This is an important 
point as most other studies dealing with intergenerational mobility do not restrict the data in 
the manner I do. The resulting elasticities are somewhat smaller, but still similar. The 
deviation of the results is 0.03 at most. This indicates that a different subsample from the SHP 
does not result in a vastly different interpretation of the intergenerational relation between 
father and son. 
Finally, table 3 C shows the different elasticities by age groups of the sons. Similar to the 
conclusion of Bound et. al. (1994), the younger the included sons, the stronger 
intergenerational mobility is biased downwards. Note that table 3 C presents the measures 
with both age-adjusted incomes for the fathers and for the sons. Even this correction cannot 
avoid the large measurement error. 
 
 
IV Measuring differences across the income distribution 
 
A. Background and methods 
 
Using least squares, the elasticity measures the linear correlation between a son’s economic 
status and that of his father’s. This measure is important since it describes a society’s mobility 
                                              
21 The t-values are calculated using standard bootstrap method (Efron and Tibshirani 1993). 
22 The fathers’ subsample including all individuals from 1991 to 2003 significantly differs on a 10 percent level 
to the fathers’ subsample 1991 if all sons are included. However, on a 5 percent level, the null hypothesis that 
parameters are identical can not be rejected. 
23 There are three reasons to do so: First, all results seem to be very robust concerning the different subsamples 
of fathers. Thus, no further information would derive from the presentation of all estimations from the other 
subsamples. Second, for the 1991 wave, the timely distance between the father’s real and observable work period 
is (probably) minimal. Third, the distribution of the father’s characteristics from the SLFS in 1991 mostly 
corresponds – measured as the total deviation in absolute terms - to the distribution of the characteristics, 
reported in the SHP.  
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as a whole. However, recent studies also concentrate on the question whether parental 
inheritance varies with the son’s (or father’s) position in the income distribution. Even if two 
societies have the same least squares elasticity, they might differ in their equality of 
opportunity as one society may discriminate individuals of a certain income quantile more 
than the other. For example, imagine a society where the average persistence of income is 
very low, but this averaged elasticity is compounded of a very mobile upper class and a very 
immobile lower class. Of course, such a society provides equality of opportunity on average, 
but unfortunately, this equality of opportunity depends on parental background. This indicates 
that a single elasticity measure might neglect substantial differences in the intergenerational 
transmission within a society. Besides the least squares estimation, it is therefore important to 
investigate nonlinearities regarding certain income quantiles. Becker and Tomes (1986) have 
provided a theoretical base for the assumption that there might be differences in the 
intergenerational mobility across income quantiles. Assuming imperfection of capital 
markets, their theory predicts that those families who suffer the most from capital market 
restrictions will experience the least intergenerational mobility because an appropriate 
investment in the child’s future might not be possible. Becker and Tomes (1986) proposed 
that low income families are mostly affected by credit constraints because their investment in 
the child’s human capital mostly relies on financial borrowing. Therefore, intergenerational 
mobility should be lower at the bottom of the income distribution. However, the question of 
who suffers most from such a capital market imperfection is discussed controversially. Han 
and Mulligan (2001) have argued that children from low-earning families are typically less 
able and therefore less constrained as they need fewer investments. High ability children tend 
to come from high-earnings families. Thus, the earnings elasticity should be higher at the top 
of the earnings distribution. However, Corak and Heisz (1999) have argued that even if highly 
able children originate from well earning families, those should have the financial capacities 
to be independent of credit constraints. They conclude that middle-earning families tend to be 
most sensitive to credit constraints as they have more able children and a stronger dependence 
on capital markets (for an overview see Grawe and Mulligan 2002). 
Other empirical results are mixed: Eide and Showalter (1999), Bratberg, Nilsen and Vaage 
(2005), and Mazumder (2001) confirm Becker and Tomes’ hypothesis; Corak and Heisz 
(1999) and Behrman and Taubman (1990) show the opposite. 
I present two different measures to investigate transmission patterns across the income 
distribution in Switzerland. First, I consider descriptive statistics of the intergenerational 
income transmission matrices for different subsamples. Then, I apply quantile regression to 
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estimate different elasticitites conditional on the explanatory variables. As described by 
Koenker and Bassett (1978) or Buchinsky (1998), the model is specified as 
 
' '
si fi θ si fi θ
' '
θ si fi θ si fi θ
y y β y x β
β min | y y β | θ | y y β | (1 θ)
≥ <
= − + − −∑ ∑) . (21) 
Here, θ  indicates a specific quantile. Quantile regression allows one to explore 
intergenerational transmission at different points of the income distribution. It is therefore a 
useful tool to test whether a son-father income relation is independent of the position in the 
son’s income distribution. As the function is not differentiable at the origin, equation (21) can 
be solved using linear programming. A simplex algorithm derived by Armstrong et al. (1979) 
is used. 
 
B. Results of the quantile analysis 
 
Table 4 first provides the descriptive statistics of the intergenerational income transmission 
matrices for all, and separately for natives and immigrants and individuals having a native or 
immigrant father respectively.24 Again, I only present the results from the SLFS 1991. With 
respect to a father’s income quartile, each number indicates a son’s probability to attain a 
certain income quartile. Table 4 A shows the transition matrix for all individuals. The overall 
immobility index – measured by adding values found in the principal diagonal and adjacent 
cells – for Switzerland is 3.01. This value lies in between the immobility index for the U.S. 
with 3.08 and West Germany with 2.92 calculated by Blanden (2005).25 Tables 4 B and C 
present the probabilities for natives and for immigrants separately. Generally, there is a 
tendency for a stronger intergenerational persistence among immigrants compared to the 
Swiss. Given that his father is also in the lowest quartile, a son’s probability for staying in the 
lowest quartile is 44.4% for immigrants and 37.5% for Swiss. On the other side, given a father 
from the highest quartile, an immigrant’s probability to belong to the highest quartile is 41%. 
The equivalent probability for the Swiss is 37%. Considering the sons with respect to their 
father’s citizenship (table 4 D and E), I find that about 39% of all individuals who descend 
from an immigrant father from the lowest income quantile are in the lowest quartile. 
Contrarily, if the father has Swiss citizenship, the probability is about 36%. However, almost 
48% of individuals with an immigrant fathers from the highest quartile are also high earners. 
The number for individuals with a Swiss father is somewhat lower. Here, the probability is 
                                              
24 Table 4 presents the descriptive statistics without the imputed values for missing sons’ income. 
25 Blanden (2005) compared intergenerational mobility for the UK, the United States, West Germany and 
Canada, also using a quartile transition matrix. The correspondent immobility index for the UK is 2.885 and 
2.771 for Canada. 
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about 37%. Compared to the Swiss with a value of 2.92, the aggregate index of immobility 
for immigrants reaches about 3.19. 
Table 4 F summarizes the ratios of a son’s probability to be in the highest quartile to the 
probability to be in the lowest quartile conditional on the father’s income position. Having a 
father in the lowest income quartile, this ratio is lower for immigrants than for natives. This 
indicates that the upward mobility for the Swiss is higher than that for the immigrants. 
However, I find higher ratios for the immigrants if the father belongs to the highest income 
quartile. Column 6 of table 4 E directly compares the different ratios between natives and 
immigrants. Column 7 shows the difference between individuals with a Swiss father to an 
individual with an immigrant father. Immigrants both have a significant lower upward 
probability, but also a significant lower downward probability than natives.  
Table 5 presents the results from the quantile regressions. The dependent variable is the sons’ 
averaged log income from the period 1999 - 2003. The fathers’ income is taken from the year 
1991.26 The overall picture in column 1 is that the estimated coefficients are similar for all 
quantiles of the sons’ income distribution.27 There is a small rise at the upper end of the 
income distribution that indicates that the intergenerational mobility is somewhat lower for 
high earners. The range of the estimated coefficient lies between 0.42 for the 7th percentile 
and 0.52 for the 9th percentile. Starting at the 10th percentile, the father – son relation rises 
somewhat up to 0.5 to the third percentile and then declines to the 7th when it starts rising 
again to 0.52. 
To ease the interpretation, figures 1 A - D illustrate the results graphically. I distinguish 
between Swiss and immigrants as well as Swiss father and immigrant father respectively. 
Each subsample is estimated separately. Immigrants in every income quantile have a higher 
elasticity than the corresponding natives. I find a somewhat opposite pattern for natives and 
immigrants. For natives, the highest elasticity is found for sons located in the highest part of 
income distribution. The lowest part is found at the 75th quantile. For immigrants, the lowest 
elasticity is found for sons from the lowest percentile. Conversely, the highest father-son 
relation is found at the 75th quantile. The graph of sons with a native father runs somewhat 
flatly. This indicates that parental inheritance is similar for all income quantiles. For 
individuals with an immigrant father, the elasticity declines at the tails of the income 
distribution. Fathers’ income is most important for the sons’ income at the third quartile. 
Generally, while the curve for the Swiss is flat, the corresponding curve for the immigrants 
                                              
26 See section II for an explanation of the calculation of the standard errors. 
27 The results for the 5th and the 95th quantiles are not presented here. As the fathers’ incomes correspond to a 
mean income for a specific set of characteristics, it can not be guaranteed that the pattern at the very end of the 
distribution does not result due to measurement errors.  
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indicates a variation in the importance of the fathers’ income to the sons’ income among 
different quantiles. I find strongest differences for sons with an immigrant father.28 
Finally, Table 6 shows the reduction of the intergenerational coefficients due to the inclusion 
of education as a control in the quantile regression. The educational impact is strongest for 
those quantiles with the highest elasticities. While the natives have a mean reduction of the 
coefficients of about 37%, the average decrease for immigrants is 43% and 46% for 
individuals with an immigrant father. 
How can we interpret these results for Switzerland? As discussed in section V, differences in 
the intergenerational mobility across quantiles of the income distribution might be explained 
by the credit constraints hypothesis (Becker and Tomes 1986): the intergenerational 
transmission will be higher for those who suffer more from capital market constraints and 
therefore for those who cannot invest in their children adequately. Regarding the Swiss, 
fathers’ incomes are equally important for all sons’ income quantiles. Hence with a mean 
elasticity of 0.39, Switzerland seems to provide equality of opportunity equally across the 
income distribution, at least for the natives. Focusing on education as a strong indicator for a 
child’s human capital, these similar intergenerational coefficients across different quantiles 
for Switzerland might become quite explainable. In contrast to other countries – e.g. the 
United States – education is publicly financed and Switzerland provides a public schooling 
system that enjoys a very high reputation. The public school is generally preferred to private 
institutions, even by the upper class. A good education is not dependant on parental financial 
effort. This also holds true for tertiary education. All Swiss universities have low and stable 
tuition fees. 29 Thus, the Swiss schooling system assists in particular low earning families who 
cannot afford to invest in their child’s education. This might be the reason why I do not find a 
similar pattern as Eide and Showalter (1999) for the U.S. and Bratberg et. al. (2005) for 
Norway. They all found a stronger intergenerational income correlation for sons at the bottom 
of the income distribution.  
It remains the question why there are some differences in the intergenerational mobility 
across the income distribution for the immigrants and for individuals with an immigrant 
father. Besides a mean elasticity of about 0.59 indicating that they suffer from a significantly 
higher intergenerational persistence compared to the Swiss, there is also strong heterogeneity 
                                              
28 Table A2 and figures A1 A – D in the appendix present the quantile regression with a control for education. 
Again, I distinguish between Swiss and immigrants as well as individuals with a Swiss and an immigrant father 
respectively. Almost all differences in the sons’ income quantile have disappeared. Thus, education is a very 
powerful factor in reducing heterogeneity in the intergenerational income transmission across the income 
distribution. 
29The average tuition is 1400 CHF per year without any other costs. Children with parents under a certain 
income level will be financially assisted by the government, regardless of their schooling performance. 
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across different quantiles of immigrants. Probably, these differences first of all reflect 
heterogeneity among different ethnic groups. However, an additional explanation could be 
that a certain number of these immigrants do not have appropriate human capital investment 
due to a different schooling system in their country of origin. This can be accentuated if 
education is a stronger signal to evaluate immigrants than natives as other factors like 
behavior, adaptability or mentality of immigrants might by unknown or at least 
misunderstood in the host country. Thus, those who are able to send the (host country’s) right 
signal will be preferred to those who are not able to do that. This might explain why some 
non-natives have obviously less equality of opportunity than others.  Nevertheless, as I find 
highest intergenerational mobility at the lower end of the income distribution among 
immigrants, Switzerland seems to provide equality of opportunity for low earners among 
immigrants.  
 
 
V Conclusion 
 
The number of countries for which the intergenerational income and earnings transmission 
has been investigated in the literature is still small. This paper tries contribute to this literature 
by delivering results for Switzerland, a country that has not been analysed yet regarding 
income mobility. 
But, what can we learn from this study? As described in section III, due to methodological 
differences to other papers, a comparison with other countries must be drawn very cautiously. 
If some weak assumptions hold, the presented coefficients can be compared to the results 
presented by Björklund and Jäntti (1993) which can be regarded as a lower bound. In that 
case, intergenerational income mobility is lower for Switzerland compared to Sweden. 
However, using descriptive quartile transition matrices, the Swiss immobility index – 
indicating a country’s degree of immobility - can be compared to results from Blanden (2005) 
who analysed intergenerational mobility for four different countries.  The Swiss value lies 
between the corresponding indices for West Germany and the U.S. which is the higher one 
(whereas the UK and Canada both have smaller values than Switzerland). Thus, although this 
study can only shed some light on a cross- national comparison, Switzerland tends not to 
belong to those countries that provide high levels of equality of opportunity. 
A within-country comparison across subgroups of the Swiss population shows strong 
differences between Swiss and immigrants. With an intergenerational income elasticity of 
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0.55, immigrants tend to be substantially more immobile than Swiss with an elasticity of 0.38. 
Also, substantial heterogeneity is found among different ethnic groups. The son-father 
relation is strongest for immigrants from Spain, Portugal, and Italy which have typically been 
countries of origin of blue collar guest workers in Switzerland. The smallest elasticity is 
found for those from Germany and South East Europe. Controlled for education, there is an 
overall reduction of the mobility-coefficient by about 40%. Generally, the impact of education 
on the intergenerational transmission seems to be negatively related to the level of education 
of a specific ethnic group. Thus, heterogeneity in the income mobility among ethnicities can 
in large parts be eliminated by an appropriate educational investment.  
Analysing differences across the income distribution, immigrants have a significantly lower 
upward as well as downward mobility than natives. Intergenerational income elasticities 
conditional on the sons’ income quantile are similar for natives across the income distribution. 
There are somewhat higher elasticities at the lower as well as at the higher end. In contrast, an 
opposite structure is found for immigrants. Here, mobility is higher at the tails of the income 
distribution whereas highest elasticity is found for sons in the 75th quantile. These patterns 
for Switzerland are in conflict with previous results from other countries who either find 
highest mobility among high-earning or low-earning families. Also, the conclusion from 
previous studies (e.g. Eide and Showalter 1999) that education is more valuable at the bottom 
of the earnings distribution can not be supported in this study. Education seems simply to be 
the mechanism to reduce heterogeneity in intergenerational mobility across the income 
distribution and its impact is not conditional on a certain income quantile. 
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Table 1 A Descriptive statistics on sons' characteristics in the sons' sample (SHP) by subsample
All Natives Immigrants Native father Immigrant father S.E. Europe Italy Germany France Spain / Portugal
Variable mean mean mean mean mean mean mean mean mean mean
(std. dev.) (std. dev.) (std. dev.) (std. dev.) (std. dev.) (std. dev.) (std. dev.) (std. dev.) (std. dev.) (std. dev.)
Son's yearly work income 80575 82323 76751 82340 74710 50487 71200 82367 89897 60081
(40486) (40127) (41037) (40211) (40890) (15520) (26750) (43545) (57487) (32544)
Age adjusted log income 10.855 10.874 10.814 10.879 10.777 10.522 10.774 10.887 10.914 10.649
(0.38) (0.373) (0.392) (0.372) (0.396) (0.236) (0.32) (0.393) (0.464) (0.418)
Son's age 40.652 41.147 39.584 40.995 39.526 37.104 40.049 39.867 40.605 36.882
(8.57) (8.708) (8.17) (8.658) (8.184) (6.439) (8.53) (7.222) (8.686) (7.391)
Son's education: low (0/1) (ref.) 0.059 0.034 0.114 0.034 0.142 0.167 0.168 0.018 0.053 0.333
(0.236) (0.182) (0.318) (0.182) (0.349) (0.377) (0.375) (0.132) (0.225) (0.476)
Son's education: middle (0/1) 0.698 0.755 0.577 0.745 0.546 0.625 0.664 0.558 0.487 0.51
(0.459) (0.43) (0.494) (0.436) (0.498) (0.489) (0.473) (0.499) (0.503) (0.505)
Son's education: high (0/1) 0.242 0.211 0.31 0.221 0.312 0.208 0.168 0.425 0.461 0.157
(0.429) (0.408) (0.463) (0.415) (0.464) (0.41) (0.375) (0.497) (0.502) (0.367)
Share of subsample by ethnic group 100.00% 68.29% 31.71% 76.61% 23.39% 2.25% 10.57% 5.29% 3.55% 2.39%
No. obs. 2138 1460 678 1638 500 48 226 113 76 51
No. obs.: income item nonresponse 318 211 107 239 79 7 42 15 14 7  
Note: Description from the SHP 1999 – 2003 before multiple imputation. Standard errors are in parentheses. Individuals were grouped by their nationality and the parents' nationality respectively. 
The group of the Swiss only includes individuals with a Swiss nationality whose parents’ both only have a Swiss passport. Immigrants are those who have a foreign nationality or those who have at 
least one parent with a foreign nationality. South Eastern Europe contains immigrants from former Yugoslavia, Turkey, and Greece. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
. 
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Table 1 B Descriptive statistics on fathers' income predictors in the sons' sample (SHP) by subsample      
           
  All Natives Immigrants
Native 
father 
Immigrant 
father S.E. Europe Italy Germany France 
Spain / 
Portugal 
Variable mean mean mean mean mean mean mean mean mean mean 
  
(std. 
dev.) 
(std. 
dev.) (std. dev.) (std. dev.) (std. dev.) (std. dev.) (std. dev.) (std. dev.) (std. dev.) (std. dev.) 
           
Father's ISCO classification           
           
Legislators, senior officials, managers (0/1)  0.074 0.07 0.083 0.072 0.08 0.042 0.035 0.115 0.145 0.02 
 (0.262) (0.255) (0.275) (0.259) (0.272) (0.202) (0.185) (0.32) (0.354) (0.14) 
Professionals (0/1)  0.108 0.101 0.122 0.107 0.112 0.042 0.027 0.159 0.197 0.059 
 (0.311) (0.302) (0.328) (0.309) (0.316) (0.202) (0.161) (0.368) (0.401) (0.238) 
Technicians and associate professionals* (0/1)  0.17 0.182 0.146 0.181 0.134 0.104 0.093 0.195 0.197 0.039 
 (0.376) (0.386) (0.353) (0.385) (0.341) (0.309) (0.291) (0.398) (0.401) (0.196) 
Clercs (0/1)   0.073 0.073 0.074 0.076 0.064 - 0.058 0.142 0.079 0.078 
 (0.26) (0.26) (0.262) (0.265) (0.245) - (0.233) (0.35) (0.271) (0.272) 
Service workers, market sales workers (0/1)   0.03 0.025 0.041 0.027 0.038 0.042 0.044 0.018 0.066 0.059 
 (0.17) (0.155) (0.199) (0.164) (0.191) (0.202) (0.206) (0.132) (0.25) (0.238) 
Skilled agricultural and fishery workers (0/1)   0.136 0.162 0.081 0.15 0.09 0.167 0.106 0.035 0.026 0.137 
 (0.343) (0.368) (0.273) (0.357) (0.286) (0.377) (0.309) (0.186) (0.161) (0.348) 
Craft and related trades workers (0/1)   0.259 0.245 0.288 0.247 0.298 0.313 0.358 0.274 0.263 0.353 
 (0.438) (0.43) (0.453) (0.431) (0.458) (0.468) (0.481) (0.448) (0.443) (0.483) 
Plant and machine operater assemblers (0/1)   0.072 0.078 0.059 0.074 0.064 0.083 0.097 0.035 0.013 0.059 
 (0.259) (0.268) (0.236) (0.263) (0.245) (0.279) (0.297) (0.186) (0.115) (0.238) 
Elementary occupations (0/1) (ref.)    0.078 0.065 0.106 0.065 0.12 0.208 0.181 0.027 0.013 0.196 
 (0.268) (0.247) (0.308) (0.247) (0.325) (0.41) (0.386) (0.161) (0.115) (0.401) 
           
Father's education           
           
Incompleted and completed compulsory school (0/1) (ref.) 0.226 0.187 0.31 0.185 0.36 0.458 0.491 0.097 0.132 0.627 
 (0.418) (0.39) (0.463) (0.388) (0.48) (0.504) (0.501) (0.298) (0.34) (0.488) 
Elementary vocational training (0/1) 0.052 0.046 0.066 0.045 0.078 0.167 0.111 0.009 0.013 0.039 
 (0.223) (0.209) (0.249) (0.206) (0.268) (0.377) (0.314) (0.094) (0.115) (0.196) 
School of commerce (0/1) 0.011 0.015 0.003 0.014 0.002 - 0.004 - - - 
 (0.105) (0.122) (0.054) (0.118) (0.045) - (0.067) - - - 
           
No. obs.  2138 1460 678 1638 500 48 226 113 76 51 
Note: * inclusive armed force. Description from the SHP 1999 – 2003 before multiple imputation. Standard errors are in parentheses. Individuals were grouped by their nationality and the parents' 
nationality respectively. The group of the Swiss only includes individuals with a Swiss nationality whose parents’ both only have a Swiss passport. Immigrants are those who have a foreign nationality 
or those who have at least one parent with a foreign nationality. South Eastern Europe contains immigrants from former Yugoslavia, Turkey, and Greece. 
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Table 1 B (continued)           
           
  All Natives Immigrants Native father 
Immigrant 
father S.E. Europe Italy Germany France 
Spain / 
Portugal 
Variable mean mean mean mean mean mean mean mean mean mean 
  (std. dev.) (std. dev.) (std. dev.) (std. dev.) (std. dev.) (std. dev.) (std. dev.) (std. dev.) (std. dev.) (std. dev.) 
           
Father's education (continued)           
           
Apprenticeship (0/1) 0.43 0.483 0.317 0.48 0.268 0.25 0.27 0.469 0.368 0.176 
 (0.495) (0.5) (0.466) (0.5) (0.443) (0.438) (0.445) (0.501) (0.486) (0.385) 
2 to 3 years: full time vocational school (0/1) 0.028 0.028 0.027 0.03 0.02 - 0.035 0.018 0.039 0.02 
 (0.164) (0.165) (0.161) (0.17) (0.14) - (0.185) (0.132) (0.196) (0.14) 
Maturity or teacher's Training college (0/1) 0.035 0.033 0.04 0.032 0.044 0.021 0.009 0.062 0.079 - 
 (0.184) (0.178) (0.196) (0.177) (0.205) (0.144) (0.094) (0.242) (0.271) - 
Fed certif, technical school (0/1) 0.13 0.14 0.108 0.137 0.106 0.042 0.058 0.168 0.211 0.059 
 (0.336) (0.348) (0.31) (0.344) (0.308) (0.202) (0.233) (0.376) (0.41) (0.238) 
University (0/1) 0.087 0.068 0.13 0.077 0.122 0.063 0.022 0.177 0.158 0.078 
 (0.283) (0.252) (0.336) (0.267) (0.328) (0.245) (0.147) (0.383) (0.367) (0.272) 
           
Father's assimilation           
           
No swiss citizenship (0/1) 0.234 - 0.737 - 1 0.979 0.801 0.593 0.632 0.941 
 (0.423) - (0.44) - (0) (0.144) (0.4) (0.493) (0.486) (0.238) 
           
Father’s age adjusted log income           
           
Fathers observed at least 5 years 10.834 10.846 10.808 10.853 10.771 10.675 10.687 10.913 10.926 10.678 
 (0.233) (0.231) (0.234) (0.231) (0.226) (0.188) (0.171) (0.204) (0.217) (0.205) 
All fathers 10.777 10.784 10.76 10.792 10.728 10.63 10.634 10.868 10.882 10.62 
 (0.248) (0.247) (0.25) (0.247) (0.243) (0.202) (0.18) (0.223) (0.232) (0.218) 
Fathers: SLFS 1991 10.845 10.864 10.806 10.87 10.763 10.677 10.694 10.909 10.92 10.671 
 (0.226) (0.222) (0.228) (0.223) (0.217) (0.182) (0.174) (0.187) (0.209) (0.211) 
Fathers: SLFS 1998 10.772 10.78 10.755 10.788 10.722 10.627 10.631 10.861 10.872 10.619 
 (0.238) (0.237) (0.239) (0.238) (0.231) (0.195) (0.175) (0.209) (0.22) (0.21) 
           
No. obs.  2138 1460 678 1638 500 48 226 113 76 51 
Note: Description from the SHP 1999 – 2003 before multiple imputation. Standard errors are in parentheses. Individuals were grouped by their nationality and the parents' nationality respectively. The 
group of the Swiss only includes individuals with a Swiss nationality whose parents’ both only have a Swiss passport. Immigrants are those who have a foreign nationality or those who have at least one 
parent with a foreign nationality. South Eastern Europe contains immigrants from former Yugoslavia, Turkey, and Greece. 
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Table 2 Descriptive statistics on father's income predictors in the father's sample (SLFS) by subsample 
     
  Individuals  All individuals 
Sample 
1991 
Sample 
1998 
Variable 
observed 5 
years 
Sample 1991 - 
2003     
     
Father's yearly real work income 80536 77168 77054 76386 
 (39660) (44160) (41156) (38190) 
Father's age 41.888 42.245 41.032 41.614 
 (9.475) (10.694) (10.906) (10.404) 
Mean wave year of father's observation 1997 1999 1991 1998 
 (2.974) (4.192) (0) (0) 
     
Father's ISCO classification     
     
Legislators, senior officials, managers (0/1)   0.094 0.089 0.059 0.102 
 (0.291) (0.285) (0.236) (0.302) 
Professionals (0/1)  0.216 0.2 0.187 0.204 
 (0.411) (0.4) (0.39) (0.403) 
Technicians and associate professionals* (0/1) 0.203 0.182 0.2 0.202 
 (0.403) (0.386) (0.4) (0.402) 
Clercs (0/1) 0.077 0.08 0.111 0.072 
 (0.266) (0.271) (0.314) (0.258) 
Service workers, market sales workers (0/1) 0.056 0.067 0.056 0.066 
 (0.229) (0.25) (0.229) (0.248) 
Skilled agricultural and fishery workers (0/1) 0.046 0.04 0.037 0.047 
 (0.21) (0.195) (0.188) (0.211) 
Craft and related trades workers (0/1) 0.207 0.223 0.22 0.203 
 (0.405) (0.417) (0.414) (0.403) 
Plant and machine operater assemblers (0/1) 0.074 0.081 0.081 0.071 
 (0.261) (0.273) (0.272) (0.257) 
Elementary occupations (0/1) (ref.) 0.028 0.038 0.05 0.033 
 (0.165) (0.191) (0.217) (0.18) 
     
Father's education     
     
incompleted and completed compulsory school (0/1) (ref.) 0.064 0.108 0.08 0.075 
 (0.245) (0.31) (0.271) (0.263) 
Elementary vocational training (0/1) 0.016 0.023 0.039 0.014 
 (0.127) (0.151) (0.194) (0.117) 
School of commerce (0/1) 0.019 0.017 0.021 0.008 
 (0.135) (0.128) (0.145) (0.091) 
Apprenticeship (0/1) 0.446 0.418 0.449 0.459 
 (0.497) (0.493) (0.497) (0.498) 
2 to 3 years: full time vocational school (0/1) 0.044 0.054 0.056 0.051 
 (0.205) (0.225) (0.23) (0.22) 
Maturity or teacher's Training college (0/1) 0.047 0.052 0.046 0.048 
 (0.211) (0.222) (0.209) (0.214) 
Fed certif, technical school (0/1) 0.239 0.193 0.197 0.224 
 (0.427) (0.395) (0.398) (0.417) 
University (0/1) 0.125 0.135 0.112 0.122 
 (0.331) (0.342) (0.315) (0.327) 
     
Father's assimilation     
     
No swiss citizenship (0/1) 0.13 0.274 0.202 0.144 
 (0.336) (0.446) (0.401) (0.351) 
     
No. obs.  25630 41362 4608 4828 
No. obs.: income item nonresponse 3124 6739 1049 634 
Note: * inclusive armed forces. Description from SLFS before multiple imputation. Standard errors are in parentheses. 
Fathers yearly real work income not age adjusted 
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Table 3 A  Least squares estimation of r by subsamples of the SLFS  - Elasticities  
       
  no. obs. Fathers Fathers Fathers All fathers 
Fathers 
observed 
  1991 1991 1998 1991 - 2003 at least 5 years
   
controlled for 
sons' education     
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
All 2138 0.455 0.276 0.405 0.411 0.442 
  (0.041) (0.039) (0.041) (0.034) (0.036) 
    [1.060] [1.362] [0.463] 
Swiss 1460 0.382 0.231 0.334 0.348 0.372 
  (0.048) (0.046) (0.046) (0.04) (0.042) 
    [0.747] [0.870] [0.257] 
Immigrants 678 0.551 0.312 0.518 0.507 0.546 
  (0.064) (0.064) (0.063) (0.055) (0.058) 
    [0.475] [0.989] [0.346] 
S. E. Europe  39 0.219 0.124 0.161 0.22 0.253 
  (0.166) (0.173) (0.154) (0.151) (0.165) 
    [0.109] [0.123] [0.155] 
Italy 226 0.508 0.297 0.477 0.495 0.535 
  (0.115) (0.11) (0.114) (0.108) (0.115) 
    [0.076] [0.330] [0.073] 
Germany 113 0.186 0.113 0.211 0.196 0.214 
  (0.164) (0.168) (0.154) (0.14) (0.152) 
    [0.073] [0.055] [0.029] 
France 76 0.376 0.309 0.382 0.352 0.366 
  (0.187) (0.186) (0.177) (0.168) (0.178) 
    [0.035] [0.186] [0.133] 
Spain / Portugal 51 0.631 0.296 0.591 0.611 0.671 
  (0.178) (0.211) (0.177) (0.17) (0.178) 
    [0.005] [0.027] [0.153] 
Swiss father 1638 0.373 0.227 0.327 0.34 0.362 
  (0.045) (0.044) (0.043) (0.038) (0.04) 
    [0.868] [0.849] [0.303] 
Immigrant father 500 0.618 0.315 0.584 0.569 0.619 
  (0.085) (0.081) (0.082) (0.067) (0.072) 
        [0.410] [0.980] [0.279] 
Note: All sons from the SHP 1999 – 2003. Standard errors are in parentheses. Standard errors adjusted using Rubin’s 
method. All incomes are age adjusted. Numbers in brackets indicate t-values for the null hypothesis that parameters in 
column (4) – (6) are identical to those in column (2) using standard bootstrap method (Efron and Tibshirani 1993) 
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Table 3 B  Least squares estimation of r by different specifications of the SHP  - Elasticities  
     
     
  excludes work interrupters, includes work interrupters, includes (2) and includes (3) and 
 highest/lowest incomes highest/lowest incomes real part time incomes controlled for son's education 
 part time job incomes extrapolated to 100%     
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
All 0.455 0.441 0.442 0.266 
 (0.041) (0.043) (0.043) (0.041) 
Swiss 0.382 0.37 0.375 0.216 
 (0.048) (0.05) (0.051) (0.049) 
Immigrants 0.551 0.522 0.518 0.31 
 (0.064) (0.067) (0.067) (0.068) 
S. E. Europe  0.219 0.112 0.106 0.04 
 (0.166) (0.181) (0.188) (0.198) 
Italy 0.508 0.458 0.464 0.276 
 (0.115) (0.115) (0.116) (0.114) 
Germany 0.186 0.205 0.202 0.126 
 (0.164) (0.149) (0.149) (0.153) 
France 0.376 0.31 0.311 0.252 
 (0.187) (0.175) (0.174) (0.174) 
Spain / Portugal 0.631 0.609 0.623 0.34 
 (0.178) (0.163) (0.169) (0.192) 
Swiss father 0.373 0.359 0.362 0.214 
 (0.045) (0.048) (0.048) (0.047) 
Immigrant father 0.618 0.584 0.589 0.313 
  (0.085) (0.086) (0.087) (0.079) 
Total no. Obs. 2138 2162 2162 2162 
Note: All sons from the SHP 1999 – 2003; all fathers from the SLFS 1991. Standard errors are in parentheses. Standard errors adjusted using Rubin’s method. All incomes  
are age adjusted. 
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Table 3 C  Least squares estimation of r by different subsamples of the SHP  - Elasticities by age groups of the sons 
      
  All age 25 - 35 age 36 - 45 age 46 - 55  
      
All 0.455 0.306 0.478 0.55  
 (0.041) (0.062) (0.056) (0.071)  
No. obs. 2138 658 792 688  
      
Natives 0.382 0.234 0.413 0.464  
 (0.048) (0.074) (0.069) (0.082)  
No. obs. 1460 429 520 511  
      
Immigrants 0.551 0.358 0.544 0.745  
 (0.064) (0.1) (0.094) (0.12)  
No. obs. 678 229 272 177  
      
Native father 0.373 0.205 0.387 0.483  
 (0.045) (0.071) (0.065) (0.077)  
No. obs. 1638 489 590 559  
      
Immigrant father 0.618 0.508 0.621 0.728  
 (0.085) (0.126) (0.116) (0.146)  
No. obs. 500 169 202 129  
Note: All sons from the SHP 1999 – 2003; all fathers from the SLFS 1991. Standard errors are in parentheses. Standard errors 
adjusted using Rubin’s method. All incomes are age adjusted. 
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Table 4 Descriptive analysis of intergenerational income mobility
Table 4 A Transition matrix for all individuals (in row percent)
Father 1. quartile 2. quartile 3. quartile 4. quartile No. obs.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
1. quartile 39.60% 27.88% 16.97% 15.56% 495
2. quartile 27.81% 28.98% 24.12% 19.10% 597
3. quartile 16.63% 24.58% 29.88% 28.92% 415
4. quartile 13.63% 17.40% 30.19% 38.78% 477
No. Obs. 496 496 496 496 1984
Son's
 
Note: Immobility Index: 3.01. Description from the SHP 1999 – 2003 before Multiple Imputation. All fathers from the 
SLFS 1991 
 
 
Table 4 B Transition matrix for natives (in row percent)
Father 1. quartile 2. quartile 3. quartile 4. quartile No. obs.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
1. quartile 37.46% 25.07% 20.06% 17.40% 339
2. quartile 28.83% 29.09% 21.56% 20.52% 385
3. quartile 17.06% 27.42% 29.77% 25.75% 299
4. quartile 15.06% 18.07% 29.82% 37.05% 332
No. Obs. 339 339 339 338 1355
Son's
 
Note: Immobility Index: 2.92. Description from the SHP 1999 – 2003 before Multiple Imputation. All fathers from the 
SLFS 1991 
 
 
Table 4 C Transition matrix for immigrants (in row percent)
Father 1. quartile 2. quartile 3. quartile 4. quartile No. obs.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
1. quartile 44.38% 28.40% 17.16% 10.06% 169
2. quartile 29.73% 29.05% 25.68% 15.54% 148
3. quartile 12.26% 29.03% 25.16% 33.55% 155
4. quartile 12.74% 13.38% 32.48% 41.40% 157
No. Obs. 158 157 157 157 629
Son's
 
Note: Immobility Index: 3.19. Description from the SHP 1999 – 2003 before Multiple Imputation. All fathers from the 
SLFS 1991 
 
 
Table 4 D Transition matrix for indiviuals with a native father (in row percent)
Father 1. quartile 2. quartile 3. quartile 4. quartile No. obs.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
1. quartile 35.95% 26.58% 19.49% 17.97% 395
2. quartile 28.47% 29.46% 22.28% 19.80% 404
3. quartile 17.27% 25.35% 30.64% 26.74% 359
4. quartile 17.03% 17.86% 28.57% 36.54% 364
No. Obs. 381 380 381 380 1522
Son's
 
Note: Immobility Index: 2.91. Description from the SHP 1999 – 2003 before Multiple Imputation. All fathers from the 
SLFS 1991 
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Table 4 E Transition matrix for indiviuals with an immigrant father (in row percent)
Father 1. quartile 2. quartile 3. quartile 4. quartile No. obs.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
1. quartile 38.71% 29.03% 20.65% 11.61% 155
2. quartile 25.74% 29.41% 28.68% 16.18% 136
3. quartile 10.34% 32.76% 20.69% 36.21% 58
4. quartile 13.27% 9.73% 29.20% 47.79% 113
No. Obs. 116 115 116 115 462
Son's
 
Note: Immobility Index: 3.18. Description from the SHP 1999 – 2003 before Multiple Imputation.  All fathers from the  
SLFS 1991 
 
 
Table 4 F Comparison of the ratios (highest vs lowest quartile)    
        
  all individuals natives immigrants individuals with individuals with  natives vs. native father vs 
Father    native father immigrant father immigrants immigrant father
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)  (7)  
       (2) - (3) (4) - (5) 
1. quartile 0.39 0.46 0.23 0.50 0.30 0.24 0.20 
  (0.05) (0.07) (0.07) (0.05) (0.08) (0.09) (0.08) 
2. quartile 0.69 0.71 0.52 0.70 0.63 0.19 0.07 
  (0.08) (0.05) (0.18) (0.07) (0.22) (0.17) (0.18) 
3. quartile 1.74 1.51 2.74 1.55 3.50 -1.23 -1.95 
  (0.4) (0.32) (1.06) (0.22) (1.42) (0.81) (1.31) 
4. quartile 2.85 2.46 3.25 2.15 3.60 -0.79 -1.45 
  (0.36) (0.37) (0.43) (0.17) (0.95) (0.64) (0.86) 
Note: Each column represents the ratio of the probabilities of the highest to the lowest quartile of the tables 4 A - E. Standard errors calculated using the standard 
bootstrap method (Efron and Tibshirani 1993) 
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Table 5 Quantile regressions - Coefficients by subsamples  
      
  All individuals Natives Immigrants Individuals with Individuals with 
        native father immigrant father 
0.1 0.48 0.43 0.425 0.383 0.443 
  (0.064) (0.074) (0.125) (0.069) (0.165) 
0.15 0.478 0.423 0.508 0.376 0.576 
  (0.052) (0.064) (0.095) (0.064) (0.132) 
0.2 0.5 0.399 0.548 0.361 0.619 
  (0.052) (0.056) (0.09) (0.056) (0.104) 
0.25 0.504 0.398 0.569 0.382 0.628 
  (0.049) (0.068) (0.082) (0.059) (0.097) 
0.3 0.495 0.4 0.589 0.386 0.636 
  (0.052) (0.06) (0.082) (0.059) (0.1) 
0.35 0.488 0.385 0.603 0.386 0.638 
  (0.049) (0.053) (0.081) (0.05) (0.107) 
0.4 0.47 0.38 0.595 0.376 0.647 
  (0.043) (0.048) (0.078) (0.045) (0.109) 
0.45 0.449 0.363 0.603 0.354 0.666 
  (0.045) (0.047) (0.077) (0.042) (0.103) 
0.5 0.43 0.36 0.612 0.344 0.669 
  (0.044) (0.047) (0.079) (0.048) (0.105) 
0.55 0.432 0.354 0.604 0.347 0.667 
  (0.044) (0.052) (0.077) (0.049) (0.106) 
0.6 0.432 0.352 0.602 0.352 0.68 
  (0.039) (0.05) (0.075) (0.045) (0.107) 
0.65 0.431 0.336 0.607 0.336 0.737 
  (0.048) (0.051) (0.077) (0.052) (0.109) 
0.7 0.42 0.313 0.63 0.314 0.768 
  (0.057) (0.054) (0.082) (0.05) (0.108) 
0.75 0.431 0.319 0.651 0.338 0.772 
  (0.054) (0.069) (0.093) (0.055) (0.119) 
0.8 0.444 0.346 0.645 0.352 0.752 
  (0.059) (0.074) (0.093) (0.064) (0.121) 
0.85 0.471 0.379 0.592 0.392 0.676 
  (0.067) (0.088) (0.101) (0.079) (0.138) 
0.9 0.52 0.436 0.571 0.437 0.587 
  (0.082) (0.091) (0.111) (0.084) (0.179) 
No. Obs 2138 1460 678 1638 500 
      
Note: All sons from the SHP 1999 – 2003; all fathers from the SLFS 1991. Standard errors are in parentheses. 
Standard errors adjusted using Rubin’s method. All incomes are age adjusted. 
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Table 6 Share of explained percentage of the intergenerational mobility by education 
      
  All individuals Natives Immigrants Individuals with Individuals with 
        native father immigrant father 
0.1 26.04% 33.02% 23.29% 31.07% 27.54% 
0.15 27.82% 27.90% 35.24% 25.27% 34.20% 
0.2 34.20% 27.32% 38.87% 28.81% 36.19% 
0.25 40.67% 33.92% 39.19% 37.43% 39.01% 
0.3 41.82% 41.75% 42.78% 40.16% 40.88% 
0.35 41.80% 36.36% 46.60% 36.79% 43.26% 
0.4 38.72% 32.63% 46.89% 35.37% 50.70% 
0.45 40.76% 36.64% 46.27% 35.88% 53.90% 
0.5 40.23% 38.89% 50.00% 39.24% 57.55% 
0.55 40.74% 37.29% 52.81% 38.33% 55.62% 
0.6 37.50% 34.94% 54.32% 34.66% 54.12% 
0.65 34.80% 26.19% 48.11% 28.87% 54.14% 
0.7 36.19% 26.52% 44.44% 29.30% 52.86% 
0.75 38.75% 25.39% 48.69% 31.66% 53.76% 
0.8 39.41% 37.86% 48.37% 35.80% 52.79% 
0.85 40.34% 39.84% 40.20% 42.86% 43.93% 
0.9 30.19% 36.93% 39.58% 28.15% 38.67% 
Average 37.06% 33.73% 43.86% 34.10% 46.42% 
Note: All sons from the SHP 1999 – 2003; all fathers from the SLFS 1991.Values show the reduction of the inter-
generational coefficients in percent due to the inclusion of education as a control in the quantile regression. 
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Note: dashed line indicates 95 percent confidence intervals of a t-distribution Note: dashed line indicates 95 percent confidence intervals of a t-distribution
Note: dashed line indicates 95 percent confidence intervals of a t-distribution Note: dashed line indicates 95 percent confidence intervals of a t-distribution
Figure 1 A    Quantile regression of son's on father's income - natives Figure 1 B   Quantile regression of son's on father's income - immigrants
Figure 1 D   Quantile regression of son's on father's income - individuals with immigrants fatherFigure 1 C   Quantile regression of son's on father's income - individuals with native father
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Appendix 
Table A1 Father regression by subsamples - SLFS
Sample 1991 Sample 1998 All individuals Individuals
Variable Sample 1991 - 2003 observed 5 years
Legislators, senior officials, managers (0/1) 0.341 0.366 0.414 0.352
(0.043) (0.039) (0.015) (0.014)
Professionals (0/1) 0.306 0.294 0.333 0.304
(0.041) (0.038) (0.016) (0.013)
Technicians and associate professionals* (0/1) 0.214 0.237 0.269 0.234
(0.036) (0.038) (0.015) (0.013)
Clercs (0/1) 0.195 0.146 0.195 0.204
(0.039) (0.039) (0.015) (0.014)
Service workers, market sales workers (0/1) 0.137 0.091 0.123 0.13
(0.043) (0.045) (0.017) (0.017)
Skilled agricultural and fishery workers (0/1) -0.121 -0.168 -0.146 -0.152
(0.045) (0.046) (0.019) (0.014)
Craft and related trades workers (0/1) 0.088 0.076 0.095 0.075
(0.036) (0.04) (0.014) (0.013)
Plant and machine operater assemblers (0/1) 0.051 0.069 0.099 0.069
(0.041) (0.041) (0.016) (0.015)
Elementary vocational training (0/1) 0.026 0.171 0.068 0.073
(0.058) (0.056) (0.026) (0.018)
School of commerce or general training school (0/1) 0.168 0.141 0.214 0.229
(0.059) (0.07) (0.02) (0.017)
Apprenticeship (0/1) 0.157 0.181 0.188 0.159
(0.037) (0.03) (0.011) (0.011)
2 t 3 years: full time vocational school (0/1) 0.255 0.19 0.237 0.193
(0.047) (0.043) (0.015) (0.015)
Maturity, high school, or teacher's Training college (0/1) 0.219 0.238 0.259 0.267
(0.048) (0.04) (0.017) (0.015)
Fed certif, technical school (0/1) 0.33 0.304 0.334 0.297
(0.042) (0.032) (0.012) (0.012)
University (0/1) 0.377 0.451 0.44 0.41
(0.044) (0.036) (0.014) (0.013)
No swiss citizenship (0/1) -0.033 -0.023 0.014 -0.02
(0.061) (0.07) (0.023) (0.027)
Interactions with No Swiss Citizenship
Legislators, senior officials, managers (0/1) -0.037 0.01 0.048 0.042
(0.09) (0.092) (0.026) (0.04)
Professionals (0/1) -0.084 -0.048 0.004 0.029
(0.069) (0.09) (0.025) (0.031)
Technicians and associate professionals* (0/1) -0.045 0.031 0 -0.008
(0.065) (0.08) (0.026) (0.031)
Clercs (0/1) -0.173 -0.053 -0.119 -0.124
(0.077) (0.09) (0.027) (0.033)
Service workers, market sales workers (0/1) -0.21 -0.091 -0.13 -0.129
(0.075) (0.086) (0.025) (0.034)
Skilled agricultural and fishery workers (0/1) 0.02 0.152 0.085 0.116
(0.135) (0.124) (0.041) (0.045)
Craft and related trades workers (0/1) -0.038 0.023 -0.007 -0.004
(0.061) (0.075) (0.023) (0.027)
Plant and machine operater assemblers (0/1) -0.013 -0.052 -0.037 -0.075
(0.07) (0.081) (0.025) (0.033)
Elementary vocational training (0/1) 0.04 -0.154 -0.018 -0.084
(0.083) (0.119) (0.032) (0.033)
School of commerce or general training school (0/1) -0.021 -0.189 -0.094 -0.077
(0.154) (0.175) (0.039) (0.041)
Apprenticeship (0/1) -0.002 -0.058 -0.069 -0.043
(0.055) (0.051) (0.015) (0.016)
2 t 3 years: full time vocational school (0/1) 0.052 -0.098 -0.118 -0.02
(0.086) (0.085) (0.023) (0.033)
Maturity, high school, or teacher's Training college (0/1) -0.07 -0.015 -0.115 -0.131
(0.085) (0.095) (0.023) (0.027)
Fed certif, technical school (0/1) -0.057 -0.019 -0.096 -0.064
(0.062) (0.062) (0.02) (0.021)
University (0/1) 0.02 -0.029 -0.071 -0.075
(0.069) (0.079) (0.02) (0.025)
Intercept 10.58 10.489 10.459 10.563
(0.044) (0.046) (0.016) (0.016)
R2 0.23586 0.26625 0.26556 0.37656
No. obs. 4608 4828 41362 25630   
Note: Regression on age adjusted incomes, results from multiple imputation. Standard errors are in parentheses..
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Table A2 Quantile regressions with control for education - Coefficients by subsamples 
      
  All individuals Natives Immigrants Individuals with Individuals with 
        native father immigrant father 
0.1 0.355 0.288 0.326 0.264 0.321 
  (0.065) (0.081) (0.128) (0.069) (0.188) 
0.15 0.345 0.305 0.329 0.281 0.379 
  (0.057) (0.065) (0.106) (0.063) (0.153) 
0.2 0.329 0.29 0.335 0.257 0.395 
  (0.056) (0.059) (0.104) (0.054) (0.125) 
0.25 0.299 0.263 0.346 0.239 0.383 
  (0.051) (0.055) (0.083) (0.054) (0.104) 
0.3 0.288 0.233 0.337 0.231 0.376 
  (0.048) (0.058) (0.081) (0.054) (0.104) 
0.35 0.284 0.245 0.322 0.244 0.362 
  (0.039) (0.054) (0.092) (0.048) (0.109) 
0.4 0.288 0.256 0.316 0.243 0.319 
  (0.044) (0.05) (0.076) (0.046) (0.102) 
0.45 0.266 0.23 0.324 0.227 0.307 
  (0.042) (0.045) (0.076) (0.043) (0.09) 
0.5 0.257 0.22 0.306 0.209 0.284 
  (0.042) (0.047) (0.068) (0.045) (0.095) 
0.55 0.256 0.222 0.285 0.214 0.296 
  (0.037) (0.044) (0.065) (0.038) (0.094) 
0.6 0.27 0.229 0.275 0.23 0.312 
  (0.039) (0.05) (0.063) (0.046) (0.088) 
0.65 0.281 0.248 0.315 0.239 0.338 
  (0.045) (0.06) (0.066) (0.05) (0.09) 
0.7 0.268 0.23 0.35 0.222 0.362 
  (0.045) (0.056) (0.068) (0.053) (0.087) 
0.75 0.264 0.238 0.334 0.231 0.357 
  (0.047) (0.057) (0.074) (0.049) (0.099) 
0.8 0.269 0.215 0.333 0.226 0.355 
  (0.057) (0.06) (0.103) (0.06) (0.121) 
0.85 0.281 0.228 0.354 0.224 0.379 
  (0.056) (0.081) (0.12) (0.079) (0.159) 
0.9 0.363 0.275 0.345 0.314 0.36 
  (0.072) (0.088) (0.13) (0.09) (0.173) 
No. Obs 2138 1460 678 1638 500 
      
Note: All sons from the SHP 1999 – 2003; all fathers from the SLFS 1991. Standard errors are in parentheses. Standard 
errors adjusted using Rubin’s method. All incomes are age adjusted. 
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Figure A1 A    Figure A1 B   
Note: dashed line indicates 95 percent confidence intervals of a t-distribution Note: dashed line indicates 95 percent confidence intervals of a t-distribution
Figure A1 C   Figure A1 D   
Note: dashed line indicates 95 percent confidence intervals of a t-distribution Note: dashed line indicates 95 percent confidence intervals of a t-distribution
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with control for education  - individuals with immigrants father
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